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Abstract
Even though widely recognized as one of the core disciplines of international eco-
nomic law, the interpretation of national treatment (“NT”) obligation has been long 
marked by legal indeterminacy. More recently, a series of landmark cases, including 
US—Clove Cigarettes, US—Tuna II (Mexico), US—COOL and EC—Seal Products, have 
fundamentally reshaped our collective understanding of the NT obligation in the 
GATT/WTO system. The objective of this article is to take stock of what we have already 
known about the NT obligation in the WTO law, identify the lingering uncertainties 
and discuss the options for the WTO Appellate Body to bring more clarity to the NT 
obligation in future dispute settlements.
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1 Introduction
It is conventional wisdom that one fundamental tension in the world trad-
ing system is the need to strike a delicate balance between the pursuit 
of trade liberalization and member states’ right to regulate.1 In different World 
1    John H. Jackson, World Trade and the Law of GATT (Indianapolis: The Bobbs–Merrill 
Company, 1969), at 788. As to why this tension is fundamental to the legitimacy of the WTO 
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Trade Organization (“WTO”) Agreements, this balance is expressed in different 
ways. As to the domestic non-fiscal regulation of goods, for example, this 
balance is expressed by the national treatment (“NT”) obligation embodied 
in Article III:4 as qualified by the exceptions in Article XX of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Compared to GATT Article III:4, 
there are at least two textual differences in the NT obligation embodied in 
Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (“TBT Agreement”). 
The first difference is that Article 2.1 does not have an umbrella provision simi-
lar to Article III:1 of the GATT; the second difference is that the TBT Agreement 
does not contain a general exception clause similar to Article XX of the GATT. 
Then, how do these textual differences inform the interpretation of NT obli-
gation in the TBT Agreement? Should Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement have 
identical interpretation as Article III:4 of the GATT?
Moreover, even though widely recognized as one of the pillars of the GATT/
WTO system, the interpretation of the NT obligation has been long marked by 
legal indeterminacy.2 One prominent WTO scholar once lamented: “After all 
these years, we are still in the dark as to the precise ambit of what has been 
time and again described as the “cornerstone” of the GATT edifice”.3 For the 
first time in the WTO history, the WTO Appellate Body (“AB”) explored and clari-
fied the nature and scope of the NT obligation in Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement 
in the recent three TBT cases: US—Clove Cigarettes, US—Tuna II (Mexico) and 
US—COOL.4 The innovative TBT jurisprudence has in turn spurred much spec-
regime, see Ming Du, The Rise of National Regulatory Autonomy in the GATT/WTO Regime, 14 
Journal of International Economic Law 3 (2011), at 641–654.
2    Nicolas F. Diebold, Standards of Non-Discrimination in International Economic Law, 60 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2011), at 832–833. Tomer Broude and Philip I. 
Levy, Do you Mind if I do not Smoke? Products, Purpose and Indeterminacy in US—Measures 
Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, 13 World Trade Review 2 (2014), at 
368. Simon Lester, Finding the Boundaries of International Economic Law, 17 Journal of 
International Economic Law 1 (2014), at 9.
3    Petros C. Mavroidis, Come Together? Producer Welfare, Consumer Welfare, and WTO Rules, in 
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (ed.) Reforming the World Trading System: Legitimacy, Efficiency, 
and Democratic Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), at 284.
4    WTO Appellate Body Report, United States—Clove Cigarettes, WT/DS406/AB/R, adopted 
24 April 2012, AB-2012-1; WTO Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Concerning 
the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WT/DS381/AB/R, adopted 
13 June 2012, AB-2012-2; WTO Appellate Body Report, United States—Certain Country of 
Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements, WT/DS384/AB/R, adopted 23 July 2012, AB-2012-3. For 
an overview of the three cases, see Gabrielle Marceau, The New TBT Jurisprudence in US—
Clove Cigarettes, US—Tuna II, and US—COOL, 8 Asian Journal of WTO and International 
Health Law and Policy 1 (2014), at 1–39. For a more critical analysis, see Petros C. Mavroidis, 
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ulation about to what extent the AB may transpose its new approach to the 
NT obligation in Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement to Article III:4 of the GATT.5 
The speculation is now over after the AB issued its landmark EC—Seal Products 
ruling in June 2014.6
The objective of this article is to take stock of what we have already known 
about the NT obligation in the GATT/WTO system, identify the lingering uncer-
tainties and discuss how the WTO Panels and the AB may bring more clarity to 
this core legal principle after EC—Seal Products in future dispute settlements. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section two reviews the WTO AB’s evolv-
ing interpretation of the NT obligation in Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 before 
EC—Seal Products. Section three examines critically how the AB dealt with 
the NT obligation in Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement in the three recent TBT 
disputes. Section four introduces the most recent EC—Seal Products case and 
reflects on how the AB has reshaped our collective understanding of the NT 
obligation in Article III:4 of the GATT 1994. Also explored in part four are some 
of the remaining uncertainties to be clarified in future dispute settlements. 
Section five concludes the article.
2 The NT Obligation in Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 before  
EC—Seal Products
With regard to the domestic non-fiscal regulation of goods, the NT obligation is 
contained in Article III:4 of the GATT 1994. Article III:4 provides:
The products of . . . any contracting party imported into . . . any other con-
tracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than that 
accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regula-
tions and requirements . . .
Driftin’ Too Far from Shore—Why the Test for Compliance with the TBT Agreement Developed by 
the WTO Appellate Body is Wrong, and what should the AB have Done Instead, 12 World Trade 
Review 3 (2013), at 509–31.
5    James Flett, WTO Space for National Regulation: Requiem for a Diagonal Vector Test, 16 Journal 
of International Economic Law 1 (2013), at 73–76; Weihuan Zhou, US—Clove Cigarettes and 
US—Tuna II (Mexico): Implications for the Role of Regulatory Purpose under Article III:4 of the 
GATT, 15 Journal of International Economic Law 4 (2012), at 1110–22.
6    WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Prohibiting the Importation 
and Marketing of Seal Products (EC—Seal Products), WT/DS400/AB/R, adopted on 18 June 
2014.
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The essence of Article III:4 is that imported products must be offered “treat-
ment no less favorable” than that accorded to domestic like products. In addi-
tion, Article III:4 should be read in light of Article III:1, which serves as a 
guiding principle of the whole Article III.7 Article III:1 reads:
The Members recognize that . . . internal laws, regulations and require-
ments . . . should not be applied to imported or domestic products so as 
to afford protection to domestic production.
As will be discussed below, the interpretation of key terms of the NT obliga-
tion, such as “like products” and “treatment no less favorable” is not an easy 
exercise.8 In particular, what has persistently puzzled WTO scholars is how 
exactly Article III:1 shall inform the interpretation of “like products” and “treat-
ment no less favorable” in Article III:4.9 Should a panel consider the regulatory 
purpose of a measure when determining whether or not there is a violation of 
the NT obligation? If yes, where should this consideration take place, in “like 
products” analysis, in “treatment no less favorable” analysis or in a separate 
and additional step after the “like products” and “treatment no less favorable 
treatment” analyses? To what extent could the consideration of Article III:1 
render a measure with detrimental impact on imported products nevertheless 
consistent with Article III:4?
2.1 “Like Products”
In EC—Asbestos, the AB found that the determination of “like products” under 
Article III:4 is fundamentally a determination of the nature and extent of 
a competitive relationship between and among products.10 In assessing this 
competitive relationship, the AB usually examines (i) properties, nature and 
quality of products; (ii) the extent to which products are capable of serving the 
same or similar uses; (iii) the extent to which consumers perceive and treat 
the products as alternative means of performing particular functions in order 
7     WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
Asbestos-Containing Products (EC—Asbestos), WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2001, 
para. 93.
8     Nicolas DiMascio and Joost Pauwelyn, Nondiscrimination in Trade and Investment 
Treaties: Worlds apart or Two Sides of the Same Coin, 102 American Journal of International 
Law (2008), at 62–66.
9     Weihuan Zhou, The Role of Regulatory Purpose under Article III:2 and 4—Toward 
Consistency between Negotiating History and WTO Jurisprudence, 11 World Trade Review 1 
(2012), at 84–87.
10    WTO Appellate Body Report, EC—Asbestos, para. 99.
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to satisfy a particular want or demand; and (iv) the international classifica-
tion of the products for tariff purposes.11 All other evidence revealing the com-
petitive relationship between products should also be considered.12 Ever since 
EC—Asbestos, the AB has taken the stance that a thorough examination of the 
competitive relationship between the two products in the marketplace, mainly 
through the traditional four-factor analysis, is sufficient to decide whether they 
are “like products”. Even if regulatory purpose in Article III:1 needs to be con-
sidered when interpreting the NT obligation in Article III:4, it should not be 
considered as part of the “like products” inquiry.
However, this market- based “like products” test has been heavily criticized 
for technical, structural and normative reasons over the years. In EC—Asbestos, 
the AB pondered the technical difficulties in interpreting “like products” under 
Article III:4:
First, the dictionary definition of “like” does not indicate which charac-
teristics or qualities are important in assessing the “likeness” of products 
under Article III:4, since most products will have many qualities and 
characteristics . . . Second, it provides no guidance in determining the 
degree or extent to which products must share quality or characteristics . . . 
as products may share only a few characteristics or qualities, or they 
may share many . . . Third, it does not indicate from whose perspec-
tive “likeness” should be judged. Ultimate consumers may have a view 
about “likeness” of two products that is very different from that of pro-
ducers of those products.13 (emphasis added)
Structurally, if a domestic regulatory measure is found to discriminate against 
imports in violation of Article III, the regulating government can seek to justify 
that discrimination by proving that it is “necessary” or “related to” the achieve-
ment of some legitimate regulatory purposes enshrined in Article XX of the 
GATT 1994. However, this is not a desirable route as Article XX was tradition-
ally interpreted stringently.14 In addition, Article XX provides a closed list of 
11    Ibid., para. 101.
12    Ibid., para. 103.
13    Ibid., para. 92; Robert E. Hudec, GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation: Requiem 
for an “Aim and Effects” Test, 32 International Lawyer (1998), at 626.
14    Gisele Kapterian, A Critique of the WTO Jurisprudence on Necessary, 59 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly (2010), at 97. Sanford E. Gaines, The WTO’s Reading of the GATT 
Article XX Chapeau: A Disguised Restriction on Environmental Measures, 22 University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of International Law (2001), at 739–862; Donald M. McRae, GATT 
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legitimate objectives for government intervention. It is doubtful whether this 
closed list written sixty years ago is adequate to justify all legitimate govern-
ment intervention in the 21st century.
Normatively, the market-based “like products” test raises a deeper and trou-
bling issue of the very symbolism of political identity, the way a society wants 
to understand its internal hierarchy of values. In this regard, the market-based 
test establishes a normative hierarchy whereby the default norm is liberalized 
trade, and for competing values, such as human health and safety and protec-
tion of the environment, to prevail, they have to be justified.15
Such concerns gave rise to an alternative approach to “like products” analy-
sis, generally known as the “aims and effects” test, in the GATT case law in the 
early 1990s. The aims and effects test can be viewed as an effort to relax 
the stark dichotomy of Article III and Article XX, especially with regard to ori-
gin-neutral regulatory measures. According to this test, “like products” are not 
defined by reference to prevailing perceptions about the pair of products in 
the market place, but by reference to the regulatory aim pursued by the inter-
vening government.16
In ‘aims and effects’ test, the panel inferred from the text of Article III:1 that 
the purpose of Article III is not to prevent contracting parties from using their 
fiscal and regulatory powers by differentiating between different product cat-
egories for policy purposes unrelated to the protection of domestic protection. 
The panel considered that this limited purpose of Article III had to be taken 
into account in interpreting the term “like products”. In the panel’s view, the 
determination of the relevant features common to the domestic and imported 
products had to include an examination of the aims and effects of the particu-
lar measure:
A measure could be said to have the aim of affording protection if an 
analysis of the circumstances demonstrated that a change in competi-
tive opportunities in favor of domestic products was a desired outcome 
Article XX and the WTO Appellate Body, in Marco Bronckers and Reinhard Quick (eds.), 
New Directions of International Economic Law, (The Hague: Kluwer International, 2000), 
at 226.
15    Henrik Horn and J.H.H. Weiler, EC—Asbestos, in Henrik Horn and Petros C. Mavroidis 
(eds.), The WTO Case Law of 2001 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003), at 31.
16    GATT Panel Report, United States—Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages 
(US—Malt Beverages), DS23/R, adopted 19 June 1992, BISD 39S/206; GATT Panel Report, 
United States—Taxes on Automobiles (US—Taxes on Automobiles), DS31/R, 11 October 
1994, unadopted.
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and not merely an incidental consequence of the pursuit of a legitimate 
policy goal. A measure could be said to have the effect of affording pro-
tection to domestic production if it accorded greater competitive oppor-
tunities to domestic products than to imported products.17
Although the aims and effects test has much to be commended, certain prob-
lems mitigated against its application. The panel report of Japan—Alcoholic 
Beverages II explained these problems in the context of Article III:2 and the 
same reasons also apply to Article III:4.18 To begin with, similar to Article III:2 
the first sentence, Article III:4 contains no textual reference to Article III:1. 
Second, the adoption of the aims and effects approach has important reper-
cussions for the burden of proof imposed on the complainant in the dispute 
settlement processes. Under such an approach, the complainant would bear 
the burden of showing not only discriminatory effects, but also that the aim 
of the measure is to afford protection to domestic production. However, the 
aim of a measure may be sometimes indiscernible. In the case of a multiplicity 
of aims, it would be a difficult exercise to determine which aim or aims should 
be determinative for applying the test. Finally, the aims and effects test may 
render Article XX virtually redundant. If panels were required to consider the 
regulatory purpose of a measure when deciding violation under Article III, 
all regulatory justifications provided in Article XX would have already been 
considered in the first stage determination of violation, leaving no reason to 
conduct the same inquiry again under Article XX.19 By contrast, the traditional 
objective “like products” test does not involve any subjective value judgments. 
Arguably, this protects the panel and the AB and may increase the perception 
of legitimacy of the AB rulings.20 Because of these defects and legitimacy con-
cerns, the AB rejected the aims and effects test in Japan—Alcoholic Beverages II 
shortly after the establishment of the WTO in 1995.
2.2 “Treatment No Less Favorable”
The panel in US—Section 337 Tariff Act (1989) stated, “The words ‘treatment 
no less favorable’ calls for effective equality of opportunities for imported 
products in respect of the application of laws, regulations and requirements 
17    Ibid., US—Taxes on Automobiles, para. 5.10.
18    WTO Panel Report, Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages ( Japan—Alcoholic Beverages), 
WT/DS8/R, adopted 1 November 1996, as modified by WTO Appellate Body Report WT/
DS8/AB/R, paras. 6.16–6.18.
19    Ibid.
20    Horn and Weiler, EC—Asbestos, at 30–31.
74 Du
The Chinese Journal of Global Governance 1 (2015) 67–95
compared to the domestic products”.21 In other words, the “treatment no less 
favorable” standard prohibits WTO Members from modifying the conditions 
of competition in the market place to the detriment of imported products 
vis-à-vis domestic like products.22
Previously the AB’s interpretation of “like products” received by far the most 
attention. More recently, the focus has shifted to “treatment no less favorable”.23 
In Korea—Beef (2001), the AB made it clear that a formal difference in treat-
ment between imported and like domestic products, even if based exclusively 
on the origin of the products, is neither necessary, nor sufficient, to show a vio-
lation of Article III:4. Rather, what is relevant is whether such regulatory dif-
ferences modified the conditions of competition to the detriment of imported 
products.24 In addition, the less favorable treatment, i.e., negative economic 
effects, must affect the group of imported products, as compared to the group 
of domestic products. In other words, the NT obligation will be breached only 
if imported products, on the whole, are treated less favorably than domestic 
products. It is not enough that one imported product is or may be treated less 
favorably than one domestic like product.25
Similar to the interpretation of “like products”, there has been a long-term 
debate on how should Article III:1 inform the interpretation of “treatment 
no less favorable”. In EC—Bananas III, the AB concluded that, as there is no 
specific reference to Article III:1 in Article III:4, there is no requirement to 
determine separately whether a measure is applied “so as to afford protection 
to domestic production”.26 In EC—Asbestos, the AB stated that Article III:1 
21    GATT Panel Report, United States Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, L/6439, adopted 
7 November 1989, BISD 36S/345, para. 5.11.
22    Peter Van den Bossche and Werner Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World Trade 
Organization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3rd ed. 2013), at 396.
23    Joost Pauwelyn, The Unbearable Lightness of Likeness, in Marion Panizzon, Nicole Pohl and 
Pierre Sauve (eds.), GATS and the Regulation of International Trade in Services (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 2008), at 366–67; Lothar Ehring, De Facto Discrimination in 
World Trade Law: National and Most-Favored-Nation Treatment- or Equal Treatment? 36 
Journal of World Trade 5 (2002), at 944.
24    WTO Appellate Body Report, Korea—Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and 
Frozen Beef, WT/DS161/AB/R, adopted 10 January 2001, paras. 137–44.
25    WTO Appellate Body Report, EC—Asbestos, para. 100; Ehring, De Facto Discrimination, 
at 925.
26    WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Regime for the Importation, Sale 
and Distribution of Bananas (EC—Bananas III), WT/DS27/AB/R, adopted 25 September 
1997, para. 216.
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“informs” Article III:4 and should act as a guide to understanding and inter-
preting Article III:4.27 The AB states:
The term “less favorable treatment” expresses the general principle 
in Article III:1: if there is “less favorable treatment” of the group of 
like imported products, there is, conversely, “protection” of the group 
of “like” domestic products. However, a Member may draw distinctions 
between products which have been found to be “like”, without, for this 
reason alone, according to the group of “like” imported products less 
favorable treatment than that accorded to the group of “like” domestic 
products.28
Here the AB explicitly recognized that Article III:1 “informs” Article III:4. Recall 
that the “like products” inquiry does not consider the regulatory purpose of the 
measure, the AB seemed to indicate that the regulatory purpose might be con-
sidered when determining whether foreign products are accorded “treatment 
less favorable” than domestic “like products”. It is also clear from the paragraph 
quoted above that there is no separate and additional inquiry on the regulatory 
purpose of the measure under Article III:1.
However, the AB did not make it clear how the regulatory purpose might 
inform “less favorable treatment” in EC—Asbestos.29 Will a finding of disparate 
impact to the detriment of imported products automatically lead to “less favor-
able treatment”, and thus a violation of the NT obligation? If not, should the 
consideration of regulatory purpose be part of the “less favorable treatment” 
analysis? What could the AB possibly have in mind when they use the tantaliz-
ing phrase whereby “a Member may draw distinctions between ‘like’ products” 
without resulting in less favorable treatment? Is it because the purpose of the 
distinction is not trade protectionism?
As some prominent WTO commentators speculated, the ambiguous state-
ment that a Member may draw distinctions between “like products” without 
resulting in less favorable treatment could certainly be a platform from which 
to embrace an intent analysis, reviving to some extent the aims and effects test.30 
27    WTO Appellate Body Report, EC—Asbestos, para. 93.
28    Ibid., para. 100.
29    Donald Regan, Regulatory Purpose and “Like Products” in Article III:4 of the GATT, in 
Bermann & Mavroidis (eds.), Trade and Human Health and Safety (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 2006), at 214.
30    Henrik Horm and Joseph H.H. Weiler, European Communities—Measuring Affecting 
Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, 3 World Trade Review 1, (2004), at 147; Amelia 
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However, it was later clarified in Thailand—Cigarettes that in EC—Asbestos, 
the AB did not mean that the panel should try to explore the regulatory pur-
pose of a disputed measure, nor may a non-protectionist explanation render 
an otherwise discriminatory measure consistent with the NT obligation. The 
correct understanding of the quoted paragraph above is that it restates what 
the AB stated in Korea—Beef, i.e., a formal regulatory distinction itself is not 
conclusive evidence of less favorable treatment. Rather, the investigative focus 
should be whether conditions for competition between and among like prod-
ucts were modified to the detriment of imported products.31
On the critical question of whether a finding of detrimental impact on 
imported products vis-à-vis domestic like products, without more, is sufficient 
to conclude a violation of the NT obligation under Article III:4, the AB report 
of Dominican Republic—Cigarettes caused even more confusion. In this case, 
Honduras argued that Dominican Republic’s requirement that importers and 
domestic producers post a bond of RD$5 million to ensure payment of taxes 
has a detrimental impact on the class of imported cigarettes compared with 
the class of domestic cigarettes. In the view of the AB, this detrimental effect 
on imported cigarettes was not enough to find a violation of the NT obligation:
[T]he existence of a detrimental effect on a given imported product 
resulting from a measure does not necessarily imply that this measure 
accords less favorable treatment to imports if the detrimental effect is 
explained by factors or circumstances unrelated to the foreign origin of 
the product . . .32 (emphasis added)
After Dominican Republic—Cigarettes, almost all panels and WTO experts 
understood the AB as saying that it is not sufficient to find inconsistency with 
Article III:4 solely on the basis that the measure at issue modifies the condi-
tions of competition to the disadvantage of imported products. The complain-
ant must also show that those adverse effects are related to the foreign origin 
of the products. In other words, a non-protectionist explanation, that is, an 
explanation unrelated to the foreign origin of the product, may be evidence 
Porges and Joel P. Trachman, Robert Hudec and Domestic Regulation: The Resurrection of 
Aim and Effects, 37 Journal of World Trade 4 (2003), at 796–97.
31    WTO Appellate Body Report, Thailand—Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes from 
the Philippines (Thailand—Cigarettes), WT/DS371/AB/R, adopted 15 July 2011, para. 128.
32    WTO Appellate Body Report, Dominican Republic—Measures Affecting the Importation 
and Internal Sale of Cigarettes (Dominican Republic—Cigarettes), WT/DS302/AB/R, 
adopted 19 May 2005, para. 96.
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that there is no less favorable treatment to imports.33 In EC—Biotech Products, 
Argentina, the US, and Canada complained that the EC had accorded less 
favorable treatment to biotech products than to non-biotech products, despite 
the fact that they are “like products”. The Panel stated:
Argentina is not alleging that the treatment of products has differed 
depending on their origin. In these circumstances, it is not self-evident 
that the alleged less favorable treatment of imported biotech products is 
explained by the foreign origin of these products rather than, for instance, 
a perceived difference between biotech products and non-biotech prod-
ucts in terms of their safety, etc. In our view, Argentina has not adduced 
argument and evidence sufficient to raise a presumption that the alleged 
less favorable treatment is explained by the foreign origin of the relevant 
biotech products.34 (emphasis added)
In US—Tuna II, the panel found that Mexico had failed to demonstrate that 
the US “dolphin-safe” labelling provisions afford less favorable treatment to 
Mexican tuna products. The panel reasoned:
The impact of the US dolphin-safe provisions on different operators 
on the market and on tuna products of various origins depends on a 
number of factors that are not related to the nationality of the product, 
but to the fishing and purchasing practices, geographical location, rela-
tive integration of different segments of production, and economic and 
marketing choices.35
Clearly, in these cases, the panels interpreted the AB report of Dominican 
Republic—Cigarettes as requiring a separate and additional step of inquiring 
whether the detrimental effect is explained by factors or circumstances unre-
lated to the foreign origin of the product, before any conclusion on “treatment 
no less favorable” may be drawn.
33    DiMascio and Pauwelyn, Nondiscrimination in Trade and Investment Treaties, at 64–65; 
Du, National Regulatory Autonomy, at 659–64; Zhou, Towards Consistency, at 106–12.
34    WTO Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting the Approval and 
Marketing of Biotech Products, WT/DS291/R, adopted 21 November 2006, para. 7.2514.
35    WTO Panel Report, United States—Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and 
Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products (US—Tuna II), WT/DS381/R, adopted 13 June 2012, as mod-
ified by the Appellate Body report, para. 7.378.
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In US—Clove Cigarettes, the AB refuted this popular understanding. In 
footnote 372 of the report, the AB clarified that there is no additional inquiry 
of whether the detrimental impact was related to the foreign origin of the 
products or whether there are any non-protectionist policy justifications for 
such a disparate impact under Article III:4. The intriguing statement in the 
AB report of Dominican Republic—Cigarettes simply stresses the fact that 
the sales of domestic cigarettes are greater than those of imported cigarettes 
on the Dominican Republic market. Consequently, per unit cost of the bond 
requirement for imported cigarettes is higher than domestic products.36 In 
other words, the higher per unit costs of the bond requirement for imported 
cigarettes was not attributable to the specific measure at issue but was a func-
tion of sales volumes.37 It is now clear that what the AB meant to establish in 
Dominican Republic—Cigarettes was a test of “causation” under which a panel 
needs to consider whether any alleged disparate impact is caused by a chal-
lenged measure.38 If some other factors, rather than the disputed measure, 
are accountable to the disparate impact, then the measure in dispute has not 
modified conditions of competition, hence no “treatment less favorable”.
In Thailand—Cigarettes, the AB has provided more guidance on how to 
approach “treatment no less favorable” in Article III.4. First, the AB stated 
that the analysis of the implications of the contested measure for the 
equality of competitive conditions must begin with careful scrutiny of 
the measure, including consideration of the design, structure, and expected 
operation of the measure.39 Such an analysis may involve, but need not be 
based on, the actual effects of the contested measure in the market place, 
nor should the Panel anchor the analysis of less favorable treatment in an 
assessment of the degree of likelihood that an adverse impact on competi-
tive conditions will materialize.40 Second, if the regulation at issue indicates 
an origin-based, de jure discrimination, i.e., the sole difference in regulatory 
treatment consists of requirements applied only to imported products; there 
is a significant indication that imported products are accorded less favorable 
treatment.41 In Thailand—Cigarettes, Thailand exempted three sets of VAT-
related administrative requirements for resellers of domestic cigarettes, but 
imposed these administrative requirements on resellers of imported cigarettes. 
36    WTO Appellate Body Report, Dominican Republic—Cigarettes, para. 96.
37    Ibid., footnote 372.
38    Zhou, Regulatory Purpose, at 1115.
39    WTO Appellate Body Report, Thailand—Cigarettes, paras. 130 and 134.
40    Ibid.
41    Ibid., para. 133.
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Without much difficulty, the AB ruled that less favorable treatment could be 
established.42 Finally, in any event, there must be in every case a genuine rela-
tionship between the measure at issue and its adverse impact on competitive 
opportunities for imported versus domestic like products.43
3 The NT Obligation in Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement
Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement provides:
Members shall ensure that in respect of technical regulations, products 
imported from the territory of any Member shall be accorded treatment 
no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin 
and to like products originating in any other country.
According to the AB, for a violation of the NT obligation in Article 2.1 to be 
established, three elements must be satisfied: (i) technical regulation, (ii) like 
products, and (iii) no less favorable treatment.44 For the purpose of this article, 
only the last two elements will be discussed.
3.1 “Like products”
In US—Clove Cigarettes, the panel questioned the conventional wisdom of 
interpreting like products primarily from a competition-oriented perspective. 
On top of the traditional four factors, the panel attempted to add an additional 
consideration, the regulatory purpose of the legitimate objective pursued.45 
The panel held that the determination of like products in Article 2.1 should 
be influenced by the fact that the measure in question is a technical regula-
tion having the immediate purpose of regulating cigarettes for public health 
reasons.46 In essence, the panel attempted to revive at least part of the aims 
and effects test in determining like products under the TBT Agreement.
The AB unequivocally rejected such an attempt for two reasons. First, mea-
sures often pursue a multiplicity of objectives. It would not always be possible 
for a panel to identify all the objectives and be in a position to determine which 
objectives are relevant to the determination of like products. If a panel were to 
42    Ibid., paras. 139–140.
43    Ibid.
44    WTO Appellate Body Report, US—Clove Cigarettes, para. 87.
45    Marceau, New TBT Jurisprudence, at 7.
46    WTO Appellate Body Report, US—Clove Cigarettes, para. 107.
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focus only on one of the multiple objectives, it may reach a somewhat arbitrary 
result in the determination of what are the “like products” at issue.47 Second, 
the concept of like products serve to define the scope of products that should 
be compared to establish whether less favorable treatment is being accorded 
to imported products. If products that are in a sufficiently strong competitive 
relationship to be considered like are excluded from the group of like products 
on the basis of a measure’s regulatory purpose, this would inevitably distort 
the less favorable treatment comparison.48
After US—Clove Cigarettes, it is settled that the determination of “like prod-
ucts” under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement adopts the same competition-
oriented approach as Article III:4 of the GATT 1994. It is a determination about 
the nature and extent of a competitive relationship between and among prod-
ucts at issue.49 In such a determination, a panel should discount any distortive 
effects that the measure at issue may itself have on the competitive relation-
ship, and reserve the consideration of such effects for the analysis of “less 
favorable treatment”.50 Similarly, a panel should not consider the regulatory 
purpose of the measures in question when determining “like products”. 51 In this 
connection, a distinction should be drawn between the regulatory purpose of 
the measures and the regulatory concerns underlying the measure. While the 
regulatory purpose should not be considered in determining “like products”, 
the regulatory concerns may play a role in the determination of likeness to the 
extent that they are relevant to the examination of certain likeness criteria and 
are reflected in the competitive relationship between and among the products 
concerned.52 In EC—Asbestos, for example, the health risks associated with 
chrysotile asbestos are considered relevant in determining whether chrysotile 
asbestos and PCG fibres are like products. This is because health risks affect 
physical properties as well as consumer tastes and preferences.53
3.2 “Treatment no less favorable”
The interpretation of “treatment no less favorable” is a tricky one in the TBT 
Agreement. The TBT Agreement does not contain a “general exceptions” 
clause similar to Article XX of the GATT 1994. If “treatment no less favorable” 
47    Ibid., paras. 113–115.
48    Ibid., para. 116.
49    Ibid., para. 120.
50    Ibid., para. 111.
51    Ibid., para. 117.
52    Ibid., para. 120.
53    WTO Appellate Body Report, EC—Asbestos, paras. 114 and 122.
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were interpreted in the same way as Article III:4, any technical regulation hav-
ing a detrimental impact on the group of imported products vis-à-vis the group 
of domestic like products would violate Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement. This 
will be the case even if the technical regulation in question has a legitimate 
regulatory objective and is executed even-handedly. Clearly, this is not an 
acceptable outcome, as it would prioritize trade liberalization with no regard 
to other non-economic social values.
In US—Clove Cigarettes, the AB first argues that the purpose of Article 2.1 
is not to prohibit a priori any obstacles to international trade. Instead, a WTO 
Member has the right to pursue legitimate regulatory objectives. The AB points 
to the sixth recital of the preamble of the TBT Agreement to support this inter-
pretation. The sixth recital expressly acknowledges that Members’ right to reg-
ulate should not be constrained if the measures taken are necessary to fulfill 
certain legitimate policy objectives, and provided that they are not applied in a 
manner that would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimina-
tion or a disguised restriction on international trade.54
After US—Clove Cigarettes, it is settled that a finding of “treatment no less 
favorable” under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement requires a two-step analysis. 
First, a panel must find that the measure at issue modifies the conditions of 
competition in the relevant market to the detriment of the group of imported 
products vis-à-vis the group of domestic like products. The existence of such 
a detrimental effect however is not sufficient to demonstrate less favorable 
treatment under Article 2.1. In the second step, a panel must further analyze 
whether the detrimental impact on imports stems exclusively from a legiti-
mate regulatory distinction.55 If a regulatory distinction is not designed and 
applied in an even-handed manner because, for example, it is designed or 
applied in a manner that constitutes a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable dis-
crimination, that distinction cannot be considered “legitimate”.56 In assessing 
even-handedness, a panel must scrutinize the design, architecture, revealing 
structure, operation, and application of the technical regulation at issue.57
In US—Clove Cigarettes, because clove cigarettes and menthol cigarettes 
are “like products” and that clove cigarettes are banned while menthol ciga-
rettes are permitted in the US, there was little difficulty for the AB to conclude 
that such differential treatment is to the detriment of the imported products. 
54    WTO Appellate Body Report, US—Clove Cigarettes, para. 95.
55    Ibid., para. 182.
56    WTO Appellate Body Report, US—Cool, para. 271.
57    WTO Appellate Body Report, US—Clove Cigarettes, para. 182; WTO Appellate Body Report, 
US—Tuna II, WT/DS381/AB/R, paras. 231–32.
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In the second step, the AB found that the cigarettes that are prohibited by the 
US measure consist primarily of clove cigarettes imported from Indonesia. By 
contrast, the “like products” that are actually permitted consisted primarily of 
US domestically produced menthol cigarettes, accounting for about 26% of the 
total US cigarette market.58 This strongly suggests that the detrimental impact 
on competitive opportunities for clove cigarettes imported from Indonesia 
reflects discrimination. Moreover, the AB found that the reasons presented by 
the US for the exemption of menthol cigarettes from the ban do not demon-
strate that the detrimental impact on imported clove cigarettes stems from a 
legitimate regulatory distinction. The US argued that the exemption of men-
thol cigarettes from the ban is necessary because of the potential impact of a 
menthol ban on US health care system due to withdrawal treatment, and the 
potential development of a black market. The AB found that US arguments do 
not really stick because it is not clear if these risks would materialize if men-
thol cigarettes were to be banned, insofar as regular cigarettes would remain 
in the market.59
In US—Tuna II, Mexico challenged a US measure that monitored and 
enforced the “dolphin-safe” label on tuna. The AB found that the “dolphin-safe” 
label has significant commercial value for tuna products on the US market. The 
US measure prohibited the use of the label on tuna marketed in the US in any 
instance where the tuna was caught by a method involving encircling or set-
ting upon dolphins. Because Mexican vessels usually catch tuna by setting on 
dolphins in the Eastern Tropical Pacific (ETP), most tuna caught by Mexican 
vessels would not be eligible for the label. By comparison, most tuna from the 
US and other countries that are sold in the US market were caught by other 
fishing methods outside the ETP. Therefore, most tuna caught by US vessels 
are eligible for a “dolphin-safe” label. The lack of access to the “dolphin-safe” 
label has a detrimental impact on the competitive opportunities of Mexican 
tuna products in the US market.60 Further, the AB concluded that the detri-
mental impact of the US labelling requirement did not stem exclusively from 
a legitimate regulatory distinction. Under the US measure, tuna harvested in 
the ETP may be labelled “dolphin-safe” if the captain and an observer certify 
that no dolphins were killed or seriously injured and that there was no set-
ting on dolphins during the same fishing trip.61 However, the US measure does 
not address mortality (observed or unobserved) arising from fishing methods 
58    Ibid., US—Clove Cigarettes, paras. 223–24.
59    Ibid., para. 225.
60    WTO Appellate Body Report, US—Tuna II, paras. 235–40.
61    Ibid., para. 176.
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other than setting on dolphins outside the ETP. As a result, the tuna caught 
in a non-ETP fishery would be eligible for the US “dolphin-safe” label even if 
dolphins had in fact been killed or seriously injured during the fishing trip.62 
The evidence shows that the US labelling requirements are not calibrated 
to the risks to dolphins arising from different fishing methods in different areas 
of the ocean, and less favorable treatment was afforded to imported Mexican 
tuna. The AB believed that it is feasible for the US to address the deficiency of 
the labelling requirements.63
In US—Cool, the US government imposed on retailers an obligation to pro-
vide US country of origin labelling (COOL) information on a range of meat 
products. In examining various possible methods of compliance with the COOL 
measure, the AB found that the design of the COOL measure and its opera-
tions within the US market, particularly the recordkeeping and verification 
requirements, meant that the least costly way is to rely exclusively on domestic 
livestock.64 In addition, the costs of compliance cannot fully be passed on to 
consumers. The AB then concluded that the COOL measure creates an incen-
tive for US market participants to process exclusively domestic livestock and 
reduce the competitive opportunities of imported livestock.65
The COOL measure thus modifies the conditions of competition in the 
US market to the detriment of imported livestock. The AB then proceeded to 
consider whether the regulatory distinctions, i.e., different labels to reflect 
the different production steps of birth, raising and slaughter, embodied in the 
COOL measure are designed and applied in an even-handed manner. Looking 
at the design and application of the COOL measure, the AB found that the 
recordkeeping and verification requirements in the COOL measure impose 
a disproportionate burden on upstream producers and processors.66 This 
disproportionality cannot be explained by the need to convey to consumers 
through labels information on country of origin because the COOL measure 
as applied is unlikely to be successful in conveying accurate information to 
consumers for a number of reasons. First, the level of information conveyed 
to consumers through the mandatory labelling requirements is far less detailed 
and accurate than the information required to be tracked and transmitted by 
these producers and processors. As a result, consumers are not able to com-
prehend the meaning of the labelling programmer accurately. Second, some 
62    Ibid., para. 251.
63    Ibid., paras. 294–96.
64    WTO Appellate Body Report, US—Cool, para. 287.
65    Ibid., para. 289.
66    Ibid., para. 349.
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labels lead to confusing or inaccurate origin information conveyed to consum-
ers. Third, upstream producers may be subject to the COOL measure’s onerous 
recordkeeping and verification requirements even when the meat is ultimately 
exempt from the labelling requirements altogether.67 The AB concluded that 
the regulatory distinctions imposed by the COOL measure amount to arbitrary 
and unjustifiable discrimination against imported livestock, such that they 
cannot be said to be applied in an even-handed manner.
It is immediately clear that the first step in the AB’s “treatment no less favor-
able” analysis mirrors much of Article III:4 case law. Moreover, the second step 
in the AB’s “treatment no less favorable” analysis resembles the chapeau test of 
Article XX of the GATT 1994.68 This is not a surprise because the sixth recital 
of the preamble of the TBT Agreement closely mirrors the chapeau. The cha-
peau of Article XX sets forth a non-discrimination requirement that prohibits 
a measure from being “applied in a manner which would constitute a means 
of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same 
conditions prevail”. In Brazil—Retreaded Tyres, the AB held that the determi-
nation of “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination” is essentially an analysis 
that relates primarily to the cause or the rationale of the discrimination put 
forward to explain its existence.69 As the AB stated:
There is arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination . . . when the reasons 
given for this discrimination bear no rational connection to the objec-
tive falling within the purview of a paragraph of Article XX, or would go 
against that objective.70
After Brazil—Retreaded Tyres, it is settled that the determination of arbitrary 
or unjustifiable discrimination will be examined in the light of Article XX’s 
policy goals.71 In Brazil—Retreaded Tyres, Brazil exempted remolded tyres 
originating in MERCOSUR countries from the ban after a MERCOSUR tribunal 
found that Brazil’s import ban constituted a restriction on trade prohibited 
67    Ibid.
68    Johannes Norpoth, Mysteries of the TBT Agreement Resolved? Lessons to Learn for Climate 
Change Polices and Developing Country Exporters from Recent TBT Disputes, 47 Journal of 
World Trade 3 (2013), at 594.
69    WTO Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres 
(Brazil—Retreated Tyres), WT/DS332/AB/R, adopted 3 December 2007, paras. 225–6.
70    Ibid., para. 227.
71    Arwel Davies, Interpreting the Chapeau of GATT Article XX in Light of the “New” Approach 
in Brazil—Tyres, 43 Journal of World Trade (2009), at 519.
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under MERCOSUR. The AB dismissed the argument because it bears no rela-
tionship to the objective of human health protection pursued by the import 
ban and even goes against this objective.72
It is also well settled that discrimination can also be arbitrary or unjusti-
fiable where alternative measures exist that would have avoided or at least 
diminished the discriminatory treatment (less restrictive alternative) and 
would enable the regulating Member to achieve its legitimate policy goals with 
the same degree of efficiency and efficacy.73 In US—Gasoline, the AB found 
that the US could employ a couple of alternative measures to avoid the dis-
crimination resulting from the application of different baseline establishment 
methods.74 The US cited administration difficulties and financial costs against 
the use of alternative measures. The AB found that they were not insurmount-
able difficulties. Precisely because of the failure on the part of the US to seek 
cooperation with the two foreign governments and to take into account the 
costs for foreign refiners, the AB ruled that US different baseline establishment 
methods to domestic and foreign refiners constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination.
In US—Shrimp, the AB found several aspects of the US regulation constitute 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination. For example, the actual application 
of the US measure, in effect, requires other WTO Members to adopt essen-
tially the same regulatory programs and enforcement practices without taking 
into account the different situations of other nations. Shrimp harvested using 
methods comparable in effectiveness to those employed in the US have been 
excluded from the US market solely because they have not been certified by the 
US. In the view of the AB, the measure is difficult to reconcile with the declared 
policy objective of protecting and conserving sea turtles.75 The AB also pointed 
out the successful Inter-American Convention provides convincing demon-
stration that an alternative course of action was reasonably open to the US for 
securing the legitimate policy goal of its measure a course of action other than 
the unilateral and non-consensual procedures of the import prohibition.76
In the recent three TBT cases the AB followed the same approach as the cha-
peau of Article XX in determining whether the detrimental impact on imports 
72    WTO Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Retreaded Tyres, para. 228.
73    Zhou, Regulatory Purpose, at 1120.
74    WTO Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional 
Gasoline, WT/DS2/R, adopted 20 May 1996, 28–29.
75    WTO Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998, para. 165.
76    Ibid., para. 171.
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stems exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction. In its analysis, the 
AB is essentially scrutinizing the cause or the rationale of the regulatory dis-
tinction put forward by the defending party to explain its existence. At the 
same time, the AB examines whether alternative measures are available that 
would have avoided or at least diminished the discriminatory treatment (less 
restrictive alternative) and would enable the regulating Member to achieve its 
legitimate policy goals with the same degree of efficiency and efficacy. In US—
Clove Cigarettes, the US argues that the regulatory distinction between men-
thol cigarettes and clove cigarettes is necessary considering the impact on the 
US health care system associated with treating millions of menthol cigarettes 
smokers affected by withdrawal symptoms and the risk of development of a 
black market if menthol cigarettes are banned. However, the AB found that it 
was not clear if these risks would materialize if menthol cigarettes were to be 
banned, insofar as regular cigarettes would remain in the market.77 In other 
words, the reasons given for the discrimination bear no rational connection 
to the regulatory objectives that the US government claimed to pursue. Also, 
the alternative measure such as a ban on menthol cigarettes would avoid the 
discriminatory treatment.
In US—Tuna, the US measure failed to address mortality arising from fish-
ing methods other than setting on dolphins outside the ETP. As a result, the 
tuna caught in a non-ETP fishery would be eligible for the “dolphin-safe” label 
even if dolphins have in fact been killed or seriously injured.78 The regulatory 
distinction clearly cannot be reconciled with the regulatory objectives of dol-
phin conservation and provision of reliable information to consumers. The AB 
also examined the US assertion that alternative measures such as the appoint-
ment of an independent observer to monitor tuna-fishing are infeasible due 
to administrative and financial burdens.79 The AB dismissed the US assertion 
and suggested that requesting a captain to monitor tuna-fishing activities and 
issue certificates could be a less restrictive alternative. Similarly, in US—Cool, 
the origin labelling program in operation fails to achieve the regulatory objec-
tives they are designed to pursue. The lack of rational relationship between the 
origin labelling program and the regulatory objective constitutes an arbitrary 
and unjustifiable discrimination.80
Given the close relationship between the TBT Agreement and the GATT 
1994, including the similarities in their texts, the panels and the AB have 
77    Ibid., para. 225.
78    Ibid., para. 251.
79    Ibid., paras. 294–296.
80    WTO Appellate Body Report, US—Cool, paras. 341–47.
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repeatedly found it useful, in examining the measure’s consistency with the 
TBT Agreement, to refer to the AB’s guidance in previous disputes concerning 
the obligations under the GATT 1994.81 In the three recent TBT cases, the AB 
has developed a clear-cut and consistent interpretation of the NT obligation 
embodied in Article 2.1. In particular, the interpretation of “like products” has 
adopted the same competition-oriented approach as “like products” in Article 
III:4 of the GATT 1994. It is a determination about the nature and extent of a 
competitive relationship between and among products at issue.82
By contrast, compared to Article III:4 of the GATT 1994, the AB has adopted 
a different approach in interpreting “less favorable treatment” in Article 2.1 
of the TBT Agreement. Under Article III:4, the “less favorable treatment” rep-
resents a modification of the conditions of competition in the market place 
to the detriment of the group of imported products vis-à-vis the group of 
domestic like products. It is controversial how and to what extent Article III:1 
informs the interpretation of less favorable treatment in Article III:4. In 
Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, similar to Article III:4, a panel must first find 
that the measure at issue modifies the conditions of competition in the relevant 
market to the detriment of the group of imported products vis-à-vis the group 
of domestic like products. Different from Article III:4, the AB made it clear that 
the existence of such a detrimental effect is not sufficient to demonstrate less 
favorable treatment. A panel must further analyze whether the detrimental 
impact on imports stems exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction.83 
In examining whether the regulatory distinction is “legitimate”, the AB has 
adopted an interpretative approach similar to the determination of arbitrary 
or unjustifiable discrimination in Article XX of the GATT 1994. It seems safe to 
conclude that the NT obligation in Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement is largely 
an integration of Article III:4 and the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 1994.
Arguably, Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement helps to reduce the pro-trade 
bias embedded in the GATT 1994.84 Under the GATT 1994, Article XX is struc-
tured as “a general exception” even if they are designed to protect some legiti-
mate public policies. If a non-fiscal internal measure is challenged, it will be 
scrutinized under Article III.4 first. Only after the measure is found in violation 
81    WTO Appellate Body Report, US—Clove Cigarettes, para. 100; WTO Panel Report, European 
Communities- Measuring Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products 
(EC—Seal Products), WT/DS400/R, para. 7.258.
82    WTO Appellate Body Report, US—Clove Cigarettes, para. 120.
83    Ibid., para. 182.
84    Ming Du, Domestic Regulatory Autonomy under the TBT Agreement: From Non-
Discrimination to Harmonization, 6 Chinese Journal of International Law 2 (2007), at 280.
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of Article III:4 will legitimate non-economic regulatory objectives be consid-
ered. This structure reflects a “hierarchy” between substantive trade obliga-
tions and domestic regulation priorities as legitimate regulatory objectives are 
subordinated as exceptions.85 This “obligation–exception” dichotomy tends 
in the first place to take a very suspicious attitude towards domestic regula-
tory measures. Even worse, the exceptions under Article XX are interpreted 
stringently. Consequently, this approach is criticized as likely to lead to a WTO 
Member losing or sacrificing its own regulatory autonomy in various areas of 
social policies solely for efficient resource allocation at the global level.86
Under the TBT Agreement, there is no such dichotomy. Legitimate regula-
tory objectives are not given an inferior status as “exceptions” to a general free 
trade obligation. Instead, Article 2.1 overcomes the pro-trade bias in the GATT 
1994 by elevating such exceptional social values to the status of inherent rights 
of WTO Members. This unitary structure means that trade and non-trade val-
ues will be considered at the same time. If the regulatory distinction is legiti-
mate, i.e., there is a rational relationship between the regulatory distinction 
and the regulatory objectives, there is no less favorable treatment and no viola-
tion of the NT obligation.
Of course, the significance of this structure difference should not be over-
stated. Besides the symbolic abandon of the “obligation–exception” dichotomy, 
the principle implication of this structure difference for the WTO jurispru-
dence is the allocation of burden of proof in practice. Under the GATT 1994, 
Article XX is an affirmative defence, with both the burdens of persuasion and 
proof on the defendant. In the context of Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, 
the complainant must prove its claim by showing that the treatment accorded 
to imported products is less favorable than that accorded to like domestic 
products.87
4 The EC—Seal Products Case and the Future of NT Obligation  
in GATT 1994
As can be seen in Part II of this article, prior to EC—Seal Products, the AB was 
rather vague on the role of regulatory purpose in Article III:1 in interpreting the 
85    See McRae, GATT Article XX, at 236.
86    Cho Sunjoon, Free Trade and Social Regulation: A Reform Agenda of the Global Trading 
System—Toward a New International Economic Law (London and New York: Kluwer Law 
International, 2003), at 36.
87    WTO Appellate Body Report, US—Tuna II, para. 216.
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NT obligation. In the landmark EC—Seal Products case, the AB finally unveiled 
its position in an unequivocal manner. In this case, the EU argued that for the 
purpose of establishing a violation of Article III:4, a finding that a measure 
has a detrimental impact on competitive opportunities for imported prod-
ucts, compared to like domestic products, is not dispositive. The EU submitted 
that a panel must conduct an additional inquiry into whether the detrimental 
impact on competitive opportunities for like imported products stems exclu-
sively from a legitimate regulatory distinction.88 In essence, the EU requested 
the AB to transpose the legal standard for the non-discrimination obligations 
under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement to Article III:4 of the GATT 1994. Such 
an analysis of “treatment no less favorable” goes beyond a consideration of 
the detrimental effect of a measure on the competitive opportunities for like 
imported products, and necessarily involves a consideration of possible policy 
rationale for such detrimental effect on trade.
The EU’s arguments represent a rather popular view among WTO 
 commentators.89 From a regulatory perspective, the EU’s position is rather 
appealing. Article 2.1 of the TBT and Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 overlap in 
their scope of application in respect of technical regulations. The NT obliga-
tions in both provisions are built around the same core terms “like products” 
and “treatment no less favorable”.90 The TBT Agreement and the GATT 1994 
also share the same objective and purpose: to strike a balance between trade 
liberalization and regulatory autonomy.91 One uniform approach to “treatment 
no less favorable” will not only clarify the scope of NT principle in the WTO 
law, but also help to make the case law more coherent across WTO Agreements 
with regard to domestic regulations including product standards.
However, the AB decisively rejected the EU’s position. Rather surprisingly, 
the AB took a strict textual approach to solve the long-standing controversy 
over the role of regulatory purpose in interpreting the NT obligation. Since 
Article III:4 does not explicitly refer to Article III:1, the AB considered that 
this omission of a textual reference to Article III:1 must be given meaning.92 
Then the AB held that Article III:4 is, itself, an expression of the principle set 
88    WTO Appellate Body Report, EC—Seal Products, para. 5.100.
89    Meredith A. Crowley and Robert Howse, “Tuna—Dolphin II: A Legal and Economic 
Analysis of the Appellate Body Report,” 13 World Trade Review 2 (2014), at 332. See gener-
ally Gaetan Verhoosel, National Treatment and WTO Dispute Settlement: Adjudicating the 
Boundaries of Regulatory Autonomy (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2002), 51–106.
90    WTO Appellate Body Report, US—Clove Cigarettes, para. 100.
91    Ibid., paras. 92–96.
92    WTO Appellate Body Report, EC—Seal Products, para. 5.115.
90 Du
The Chinese Journal of Global Governance 1 (2015) 67–95
forth in Article III:1. Consequently, if there is “less favorable treatment” of the 
group of like imported products, there is, conversely, protection of the group of 
like domestic products. In other words, the AB in EC—Seal Products supports 
the position that “less favorable treatment” is equal to a detrimental impact 
on competitive opportunities for imported products. There is no need to con-
sider the regulatory purpose of the measure in Article III:1 and a finding of 
a detrimental impact will automatically send the measure to be justified 
under Article XX.93
The AB’s interpretation of “treatment no less favorable” reminds the readers 
of its position in EC—Bananas III in 1997. Admittedly, it has the advantage of 
a clear division of labor between Article III:4 and Article XX. Though both the 
TBT and the GATT 1994 share the need to strike a delicate balance between 
the pursuit of trade liberalization and member states’ right to regulate, this bal-
ance is expressed in different ways. In the GATT 1994, this balance is expressed 
by the NT obligation in Article III:4 as qualified by the general exception 
clause in Article XX in the GATT 1994. The AB in EC—Seal Products made it 
clear only the trade impact of the contested measure will be considered under 
Article III:4. Any possible legitimate policy justifications for the detrimental 
trade impact, which delineate the scope of a Member’s right to regulate, will be 
considered under Article XX only. After EC—Seal Products, the long-standing 
controversy on whether Article III affords policy space for a Member to con-
sider Article XX-like policy justifications is over.
Indeed, the major difficulty with the EU’s position is that it is likely to dis-
rupt the delicate balance between Article III and Article XX and risk rendering 
Article XX inutile. Like it or not, the WTO Members agreed to a rules-excep-
tion structure in the GATT 1994. All non-economic policy justifications are 
supposed to be considered under Article XX. Admittedly, under Article 2.1 of 
the TBT Agreement, the second step of this analysis is almost identical to the 
chapeau test of Article XX. However, bearing in mind the contextual discrep-
ancies between Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 and Article 2.1 of the TBT, it is 
challenging to introduce the concepts such as legitimate regulation distinc-
tion and even-handedness in Article 2.1 of the TBT to article III:4, nor is it pos-
sible to consider fully all possible non-protectionist policy justifications under 
Article III:1.
However, the AB’s interpretation of “treatment no less favorable” in 
EC—Seal Products is not free from doubts. First, the drafting record of the 
93    WJ Davey and KE Maskus, Thailand—Cigarettes (Philippines): A More Serious Role for 
the “Less Favourable Treatment” Standard of Article III:4, 12 World Trade Review 2 (2013), 
at 178.
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GATT NT obligation suggests that the specific intention of incorporating 
Article III:1 was to mandate purpose inquiries in dealing with origin-neutral 
measure under Articles III:2 and III:4.94 The AB’s approach denies any pos-
sibility for the panel to undertake an analysis of the regulatory purpose when 
determining “treatment no less favorable”. Second, the AB’s interpretation of 
less favorable treatment may create inconsistent rulings between the GATT 
1994 and the TBT Agreement in the future. Article XX provides a closed list 
of legitimate objectives for government intervention.95 By contrast, under 
Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, the list of possible legitimate objectives that 
may factor into an analysis is open. Thus, a technical regulation that has a det-
rimental impact on imports would be permitted if such detrimental stems 
from a legitimate regulatory distinction, while, under Article III:4 of the GATT 
1994, the same technical regulation would be prohibited if the objective that 
it pursues does not fall within the subparagraphs of Article XX.96 Therefore, if 
WTO panels were to confine purpose inquiries to Article XX, then the policy 
space that members want to retain with regard to the use of domestic mea-
sures in GATT 1994 may be severely restricted and the legitimacy of the multi-
lateral trading system may be undermined.97
Clearly, the AB did not share such concerns.98 The AB emphasized that the 
balance between trade liberalization and Members’ right to regulate in the TBT 
Agreement is not, in principle, different from the balance set out in the GATT 
1994.99 If so, then the fact that this balance is expressed in different forms in 
different Agreement should not result in inconsistent rulings. This may imply 
that the AB may interpretation the legitimate regulatory objectives in the sub-
paragraphs of Article XX more liberally in future disputes. The AB’s expansive 
interpretation of “public morals” in Article XX(a) is an example in point.100
The full implication of the AB’s ruling remains to be seen. The AB seems 
to have imposed a “strict liability” on importing countries. As Howse pointed 
94    See Zhou, Towards Consistency, at 100–102.
95    F. Roessler, Beyond the Ostensible: A Tribute to Professor Robert Hudec’s Insights on the 
Determination of the Likeness of Products under the National Treatment Provisions of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 37 Journal of World Trade 4 (2003), at 777.
96    WTO Appellate Body Report, EC—Seal Products, para. 5.118.
97    Gene M. Grossman, Henrik Horn and Petros C. Mavroidis, Legal and Economic Principles 
of World Trade Law: National Treatment, IFN Working Paper No. 917 (2012), at 129.
98    WTO Appellate Body Report, EC—Seal Products, paras. 5.128–5.129.
99    Ibid., para. 5.127.
100    Joost Pauwelyn, “The Public Morals Exception after Seals- How to Keep it under Check?” 
http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2014/05/the-public-morals-exception-after-
seals-how-to-keep-it-in-check.html  (accessed on 27 May 2014).
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out, very few legislative or regulatory distinctions between products would 
not fail this test. National safety, environmental and health rules, for example, 
are quite likely to have a different impact on goods manufactured in different 
places. The logical implication is that a large universe of laws and regulations is 
now prima facie illegal under WTO law. The outcome seems extreme and hard 
to reconcile with the intent and text of the GATT.101
To be fair, there are still a few possible “buffers” in Article III:4 after the AB 
decision in EC—Seal Products. Interpreted properly, these buffers may suggest 
some regulatory space for innocent regulations to pass muster under Article 
III:4. The first one is the AB’s interpretation of the “genuine relationship” 
requirement between the measure at issue and its adverse impact on competi-
tive opportunities for imported versus like domestic products.
To be clear, after EC—Seal Products, there is still room to argue that even 
if the measure at issue has a disparate impact on imported products com-
pared to like domestic products, there is no “less favorable treatment”. The key 
argument will be that a “genuine relationship” between the measure and the 
disparate impact on competitive opportunities does not exist. In Thailand—
Cigarettes, the AB requires that in every case such a genuine relationship must 
exist.102 A genuine relationship means that it is the governmental measure 
at issue that affects the conditions under which like products, domestic and 
imported, compete in the market within a Member’s territory.103 In Dominican 
Republic—Cigarettes, a fixed expense, such as the annual fee for the bond, 
leads necessarily to different per-unit costs among supplier firms, to the extent 
that these firms have different volumes of production or volumes of sales.104 
Because imported cigarettes have a smaller market share, per unit costs of 
the bond requirement for imported cigarettes are higher than domestic cig-
arettes. The AB held that there was no “less favorable treatment” essentially 
because the disparate impact on imported products was not attributable to the 
measures at issue, but because of greater market shares of domestic ciga-
rettes than those of imported cigarettes on the Dominican Republic market. 
In EC—Seal Products, the AB also identified a second possible scenario where 
the disparate market impact was caused not by the governmental measure but 
entirely by private choices.105 The “genuine relationship” requirement offers 
101    Rob Howse, Joanna Langille and Katie Sykes, Sealing the Deal: the WTO Appellate Body’s 
Report in EC—Seal Products, 18 (12) ASIL Insights, 4 June 2014.
102    WTO Appellate Body Report, Thailand—Cigarettes, para. 134.
103    WTO Appellate Body Report, EC—Seal Products, para. 5.105.
104    WTO Appellate Body Report, Dominican Republic—Cigarettes, para. 98.
105    WTO Appellate Body Report, EC—Seal Products, para. 5.336.
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some room for a clearly non-protectionist measure with only incidental and 
negligible impact on imports to pass muster the “no less favorable treatment” 
test. In future trade disputes, whether there is a “genuine relationship” between 
the measure at issue and its adverse impact on competitive opportunities for 
imported versus like domestic products will be the main battlefield for the dis-
puting parties.
The second issue is the role of “the design, structure and expected opera-
tions of the measures” in the “treatment no less favorable” analysis. In EC—Seal 
Products, the AB explicitly denied the relevance of Article III:1 in interpreting 
“treatment no less favorable”. Even so, there is lingering doubt on whether the 
AB has implicitly considered the regulatory purpose of the contested mea-
sure. This point could be observed from the AB’s emphasis on examining “the 
design, structure and expected operations of the measure” when assessing 
whether the regulation at issue has modified the conditions of competition 
between imported and domestic like products under Article III:4.106 This is 
precisely the same approach that the AB has taken when assessing whether 
the dissimilar taxation of the directly competitive or substitutable imported 
and domestic products is applied “so as to afford protection” in the second sen-
tence of Article III:2.107
The second sentence of Article III:2 specifies the NT obligation for internal 
taxation on directly competitive or substitutable products. It specifically refers 
to Article III:1. Article III:2 reads:
The [imported] products . . . shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to 
internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of those 
applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products. Moreover, no 
contracting party shall otherwise apply internal taxes or other internal 
charges to imported or domestic products in a manner contrary to the 
principles set forth in paragraph 1.
Article III:2, second sentence, has an Interpretative Note that reads:
A tax conforming to the requirements of the first sentence of paragraph 2 
would be considered to be inconsistent with the provisions of the second 
106    WTO Appellate Body Report, Thailand—Cigarettes, paras. 130 and 134.
107    WTO Appellate Body Report, Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/
DS10/AB/R, adopted 1 November, para. 116; WTO Appellate Body Report, Philippines—
Taxes on Distilled Spirits (Philippines—Distilled Spirits), WT/DS396/AB/R, adopted 
20 January 2012, para. 190.
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sentence only in cases where competition was involved between . . . the 
taxed product and . . . a directly competitive or substitutable product 
which was not similarly taxed.
Therefore, to find violation of the second sentence of Article III:2, it must be 
established that the dissimilar taxation between the directly competitive or 
substitutable imported and like domestic products is applied “so as to afford 
protection”.108 On how to establish this element, the AB noted:
We believe [it] requires a comprehensive and objective analysis of the 
structure and application of the measure in question on domestic as 
compared to imported products . . . Although it is true that the aim of a 
measure may not be easier ascertained, nevertheless its protective appli-
cation can most often be ascertained from the design, the architecture, 
and the revealing structure of a measure.109
In Thailand—Cigarettes, the AB similarly mandated the panel to examine “the 
design, structure and expected operations” of the measure when assessing 
whether the regulation at issue has modified the conditions of competition 
between imported and domestic like products.110 By examining the same ele-
ments, the AB will be able to ascertain, even if implicitly, whether the measure 
in dispute is applied “so as to afford protection” for domestic production.
The AB’s blunt rejection of the need to consider the possible policy ration-
ale in EC—Seal Products raises the question of the purpose of examining “the 
design, structure and expected operations” of the measure under Article III:4 in 
future disputes. One plausible interpretation may be that in Article III:4, 
the purpose of examining “the design, structure and expected operations” 
of the measure is to ascertain the disparate impact on imported products, 
whilst in the second sentence of Article III:2, the purpose is to ascertain the 
protectionist intent. But this is clearly an artificial distinction. In practice, a 
panel member will instinctively want to know if the measure has a bona fide 
regulatory purpose and to what extent its market effects are protective when 
they are called to decide whether the measure in question is in violation 
of Article III.111 Even though the AB has explicitly denied the need to consider 
Article III:1 it was explicitly denied by the AB in EC—Seal Products. Rather 
108    Ibid.
109    WTO Appellate Body Report, Japan—Alcoholic Beverages II, para. 120.
110    WTO Appellate Body Report, Thailand—Cigarettes, paras. 130 and 134.
111    Hudec, Constraints on National Regulation, at 634–35.
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than being a separate step in Article III:2 analysis, it may be argued that the 
consideration of Article III:1 is subsumed within the “treatment less favour-
able” analysis. Many hope that in its future decisions the AB might step back 
from its drastic decision to ignore all possible policy justifications under 
Article III:4 itself.112
5 Conclusion
As a pillar of international economic law, the NT obligation contributes sig-
nificantly to the well-functioning and legitimacy of the world trading system. 
Unfortunately, the case law on the NT obligation has been long tainted by 
inconsistency and confusion. At the center of inconsistency lies the fundamen-
tal tension between the liberal devotion to free trade and the sovereign’s right 
to tax, legislate, and regulate according to domestically determined policy.113
The recent TBT jurisprudence on the NT obligation has rekindled WTO 
scholars’ interests in exploring its implications for the interpretation of NT 
obligation in Article III:4 of the GATT 1994. On the one hand, the extensive 
cross-fertilization of case law between the GATT 1994 and the TBT has pro-
vided some fresh evidence testifying the convergence of international trade 
law.114 On the other hand, the convergence is limited because it is difficult 
for WTO tribunals to overcome different textual and contextual structures 
among WTO Agreements and the well-established judicial precedents that 
have been built upon these distinct structures over the past sixty years. 
Despite serious efforts to bridge the gap, it seems that to achieve complete 
convergence on the NT obligation in the GATT/WTO law is not likely to hap-
pen in the short run. Like it or not, we have to live with the tale of interpreting 
the same NT obligation in divergent approaches in the GATT/WTO law in the 
foreseeable future.
112    Howse, Langille and Sykes, Sealing the Deal.
113    DiMascio and Pauwelyn, Nondiscrimination in Trade and Investment Treaties, at 59.
114    J.H.H. Weiler, Cain and Abel-Convergence and Divergence in International Trade Law, 
in J.H.H. Weiler (ed.), The EU, the WTO and the NAFTA: Towards a Common Law of 
International Trade (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000), at 3–4.
